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REFORMING THE CULTURE OF FINANCIAL 
REPORTING: THE PCAOB AND THE METRICS 
FOR ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS 
JAMES D. COX* 
The financial bubble that burst in 2000 began a meltdown of stock 
prices that ultimately removed an estimated $8.5 trillion from the Nasdaq 
market alone.1 This painful process did not occur quickly, but like the 
bubble that preceded it, transpired over several years. Thus, history was 
recently made when a third consecutive calendar year ended with the 
major stock indices below their earlier year-end levels.2 Over these three 
dark years, retirees have seen their salad days disappear, to be replaced by 
beans and franks. Others have placed their plans for early retirement on 
hold. These have not been good times for U.S. financial markets.  
The collapse of the U.S. securities markets has yielded Darwinian-like 
effects. Frail companies who could conceal their weaknesses when a rising 
tide of euphoria lifted all boats have crashed on the reality shoals created 
by the now-withered optimism of investors. Also damaged in the process 
was our assurance that the U.S. regulatory climate provided the level of 
protection to investors to merit their on-going confidence.3 Thanks to the 
financial frauds that are being revealed by Enron, Global Crossing, 
WorldCom, Tyco and the like, hiding money in the mattress rather than 
investing it in the market is a more credible choice these days than it was 
in the 1990s. Each of these were cause in themselves to make us question 
what happened to the many safeguards believed to be in place to protect 
 * Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, School of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for 
the comments received from Professors Kelly Richmond Pope and Robert W. Hillman on an earlier 
draft of this paper and to the excellent research assistance of Ms. Gitanjali Lakhotia and Mr. Daniel 
O’Neill.  
 1. See, e.g., Editorial, Cutting Interest Rates Won’t Halt Deflation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Nov. 5, 2002, at B6. Estimates of the overall market loss range widely.  
 2. Kate Kelly, Industrials Near Worst Year Since ’77; Nasdaq May See Third-Biggest Drop, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at C1. Further evidence of the adverse effects of the market’s collapse are 
the efforts of insurance companies who are approaching state legislatures to reduce from three percent 
to one-and-one-half percent the amount of gain they will guaranty for standard annuity contracts. See 
Bridget O’Brian, Insurers Find It Hard to Guarantee 3% Return, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2002, at C1. 
There has been also the disappearance of the IPO market. 
 3. Estimates of the harm caused by the financial frauds vary. See, e.g., Mike McNamee et al., 
Accounting Wars, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2000, at 157 (losses attributable to accounting failures between 
1993-2000 are at least $88 billion) [hereinafter McNamee et al.]. A somewhat different focus is on the 
estimates of costs related to corporate governance failures for which the Brookings Institute placed a 
$35 billion cost on the economy. See Alan Beattie, Corporate Scandals Will Cost U.S. $35 bn, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at P8. 
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investors. Further disquiet is found in the significant increase in earnings 
restatements.4 After all, one can well view earnings restatements as 
fraudulent reporting sans scienter. In combination, the parade of financial 
horribles over the last year has made us reexamine the fixtures that for 
decades were the cornerstones of the U.S. financial regulatory system. 
No good national malaise goes unrecognized or unrewarded by 
Congress. Post-Enron, there were few congressional committees and 
subcommittees that did not convene to investigate, posture, and propose 
reforms. And, just when things began to simmer down a bit in Congress, 
financial frauds returned to the front pages of the financial press with the 
book-cooking allegations by WorldCom and then AOL-Time Warner. 
This was too much to resist for the recess/election bound Congress. So, 
Congress acted. The result was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 on July 29, 2002, the most significant amendment to the U.S. 
securities laws in their seventy-year history. 
Sarbanes-Oxley itself reflects the belief that an important contributing 
factor to the financial maelstrom is that U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) have become too rule-oriented.5 People 
 4. In 1990, there were thirty-three earnings restatements. In five years, the number of 
restatements increased by fifty percent to fifty restatements. In 2000, there were 157 earnings 
restatements, more than triple the number five years earlier and five times the number at the beginning 
of the decade, and in 2002, this number reached a record high of 330. See Huron Consulting Group, 
An Analysis of Restatement Matters: Rules, Errors, Ethics, For the Five Years Ended December 31, 
2002 (Jan. 2003); Min Wu, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial Reporting (June 2001) 
(unpublished paper on file with author). See generally GAO, Financial Statement Restatments: Trends, 
Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges, GAO-03-138 (Oct. 4, 2002). 
Earnings statements are accompanied by price adjustments in the security of the restating firm. One 
estimate places the loss in market value due to restatements made for the period 1998-2000 at seventy-
three billion dollars. See George B. Moriarty & Philip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the 
Quality of Financial Reporting, 17 FIN. EXECUTIVE 5, 56 (2001). The GAO estimated unadjusted 
market losses of $100 billion. See GAO, Financial Statement Restatement Database, GAO-03-395R 
(Jan. 17, 2003). Earnings restatements are symptomatic of the aggressive and opportunistic use of 
accounting principles. Opacity and lacunae in accounting metrics were shamelessly exploited by the 
firms’ managers. Too frequently, it appears, the public accountants accorded their audit clients the 
benefit of any ambiguity in accounting principles. 
 5. Therefore, Section 108 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides that the SEC is to undertake a study of 
the adoption of a more principles-based reporting system and to report its results to Congress by July 
2003. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 108 (2002). See SEC Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a 
Principles-Based Accounting System (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/Studies/ 
principlesbasedstand.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Study of Principles-Based 
Accounting]. The chief accounting standard setting body, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
has itself heard the call and begun its own consideration of whether and how the metrics for financial 
reporting can be more principles-based. See FASB Proposal: Principles-Based Approach to U.S. 
Standard Setting, No. 1125-001 (Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/proposals/principles-
based_approach.pdf (comparing the effects of each approach) [hereinafter FASB Proposal].  
 In fact, the debate regarding rules versus principles has long been part of the unrest that has 
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with this belief insist that financial reporting, and most particularly, 
GAAP, should instead be more principles-based with less emphasis on 
elaborate sets of rules regarding the measurement of assets, liabilities, 
revenue, and other financial items.6 Stated somewhat differently, over time 
GAAP has evolved so that authoritative statements, such as the statements 
issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, bear a strong 
resemblance to the much maligned regulations of the Internal Revenue 
Code.7 With so many rules, and their seemingly endless qualifications, it is 
too easy for the accountant to rationalize that if a specific treatment is not 
prohibited, then it must be permissible. Hence, the reasoning is that the 
abundance of technical rules leads naturally to the trees obscuring the 
surrounded the accounting standard setting. The committee that was formerly headed up by Francis 
Wheat and that provided the momentum for replacing the then Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
with the FASB did so because it believed standards developed by the APB were not principles at all 
and should have greater specificity. See AICPA, Standards, Report of the Study on Establishment of 
Accounting Principles 13 (Chaired by Francis M. Wheat). The debate also is not isolated to the United 
States. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: 
Hearing Before U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(statement of Sir David Tweedie, Chairman, International Accounting Standards Board) (observing 
that detailed rules with bright lines are counter-productive and lead to a serious risk of obscuring the 
underlying principles). An excellent discussion of the choice between principles and rules appear in 
Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 61 (2003); AAA 
Financial Accounting Standards Comm., Evaluating Concepts-Based vs. Rules-Based Approaches to 
Standard Setting, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 73 (2003); Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the 
Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91 (2003). 
 6. The most visible of those making the call was former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt. See The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing on Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron 
and Other Public Companies Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). See 
also Susan S. Bies, Federal Reserve Board Governor, Address to Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, in Other Developments, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 2046 (2002); Corporate 
Accounting Practices: Is There a Credibility GAAP?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Insurance and Government, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Edmund L. Jenkins, Chair, 
Financial Accounting Standards Board). 
 7. The most frequently raised example of this is FASB, Amendment of Statement 133 on 
Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities, FIN. ACCT. SERIES (May 1, 2002). Appendix A of 
FASB Proposal, supra note 5, provides a clear illustration of the complexity of FASB Statement 133 
by demonstrating how a rule can grow increasingly complex in creating exceptions to its own 
exceptions. The source of the complexity of this pronouncement is not solely that derivative 
instruments are inherently complex and are multidimensional, but that businesses and their auditors 
sought numerous exceptions to avoid valuing the derivatives at their fair market value, a result that 
would have caused greater variability in the reporting company’s earnings. See Lynn E. Turner, 
“Cookbook For Reform: Lessons Learned From Fraudulent Financial Reporting,” Address to 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, National Conference on Advanced Litigation 
Services and Fraud (Oct. 31, 2002). See also FASB Proposal, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that the detail 
and complexity in accounting statements “has been demand-driven”). 
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vision of the dominating forest. As such, the audit opinion may stand for 
nothing more than the absence of the auditor finding no violation of the 
rules, and not that the financial statements fairly present the company’s 
financial performance or position. Those who champion a more principles-
based orientation would eliminate the exceptions and qualifications of the 
present pronouncements and replace them with more encompassing 
standards. 
The complaints against rules-based standards occur on several levels. 
First, there is the view that rules, like trees, can obscure the more accurate 
view of the financial forest that management has tended. That is, the 
presence of bright-line tests invites focusing on details and losing sight of 
the guiding principle that the financial statements should fairly present the 
financial position and performance of the reporting company. A second 
ground for complaint is that of efficiency. Accounting standards have 
become so complex that they dwarf the capacity of the professional who 
prepares the statements and the sophisticated analyst to interpret what is 
thereby communicated so that neither competently performs his task.8 
American accounting standards, so the complaint goes, have reached a 
level where the medium is not understood due to the inherent complexity 
of the reporting metrics that guide the message. 
This Article approaches the principles versus rules debate from the 
cultural perspective of the American boardroom with an emphasis on the 
monitoring model’s dependence on not just the independence of directors, 
but on their outside advisors. Part I examines the evolution of the audit 
committee with special emphasis on the recent contributions of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the amended listing requirements of the New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq to strengthen the independence of the audit 
committee. Part II provides a more sobering image by examining the 
inertial forces that today’s reform efforts must overcome if progress is to 
be made toward greater independence of auditors from their client’s 
management. The substantive legal environment of rules-oriented systems 
is examined in Part III. Finally, Part IV concludes this Article on a hopeful 
note of the promise of the newly created Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). The overall thesis of this Article is that 
 8. A graphic illustration of this is the measurement provided by Mr. Frederick Gill, senior 
technical manager of the AICPA. Mr. Gill reports that the original pronouncements of the FASB plus 
its all important FASB Emerging Issues Task Force consensuses stand seven inches high, thus 
dwarfing the more principles-based standards of the International Accounting Standards and its 
interpretations which stand a mere two inches. See Frederick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting 
Standards (Feb. 15, 2003) (unpublished paper on file with author). 
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outside directors should be the strongest proponents for an activist 
PCAOB. 
I. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE IN THE POST-ENRON ERA 
The audit committee has long been a vital organ for improving the 
health of corporate governance. In 1999, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), Nasdaq, and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) mandated 
that listed companies have an audit committee comprised of at least three 
independent directors.9 Just a few years earlier, the American Law 
Institute Corporate Governance Project, in the face of stiff opposition from 
its members against a more mandatory edict, had to soften its call for audit 
committees of large public companies to adhere to the good corporate 
practices it recommended.10 
What is remarkable in the reforms introduced by Sarbanes-Oxley is 
that they follow soon after the SEC’s own Blue Ribbon Committee gave 
rise to important changes in the listing requirements of the NYSE, Nasdaq, 
and AMEX exchanges.11 The cause of the SEC empanelling the Blue 
Ribbon Committee was a 1999 study of companies charged by the SEC 
with financial fraud from 1987 to 1997. The study found that twenty-five 
percent of the surveyed companies did not have an audit committee, that 
of those that did have an audit committee, nearly one-third of the 
committee members’ independence was compromised by close 
relationships with, or actual participation in, the company’s management, 
and that sixty-five percent of the committee members lacked accounting or 
financial expertise.12 In response to the report, the listing requirements for 
each of the markets were modified. The changes introduced, which are 
substantially identical across the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX, included the 
following: each listed firm must have an audit committee of three 
 9. See NYSE Rulemaking, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42,233, 71 SEC Docket 639 
(Dec. 14, 1999) (approving changes in the NYSE listing requirements for audit committees); NASD 
Rulemaking, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42,231, 71 SEC Docket 624 (Dec. 14, 1999) 
(approving changes in listing requirements for Nasdaq and AMEX for audit committees). 
 10. See ALI, 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 305 (1992) (recommending audit committee for companies with 2,000 shareholders and $100 
million in assets). Audit committees have been a fixture of the American corporate governance scene 
for sometime. A 1979 study by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries found that 963 of 993 
respondents in its study had an audit committee. Id. at 107 n.4. 
 11. See Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, reprinted in 54 BUS. LAW. 1067 (1999). 
 12. See Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. 
Public Companies (monograph published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission, 1999). 
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“independent directors” (in exceptional circumstances one member may be 
non-independent); the definition of independence requires, among other 
factors, that each audit committee member not have been an employee 
within three years or received (excluding board fees) compensation greater 
than $60,000 (the NYSE expressed this limitation more generally, 
proscribing a relationship that would impede the director’s independence); 
each member must be financially literate; one member must have financial 
sophistication, such as employment experience in finance or accounting; 
and each audit committee must have a written charter.13 The Blue Ribbon 
Committee’s proposals not only gave rise to changes in the listing 
requirements, but also the SEC amended its disclosure requirements to 
complement the tightened independence requirements and obligations of 
the audit committee.14 For example, each audit committee is required, on 
the issuer’s annual Form 10-K, to disclose whether its recommendation 
that the financial statements be included in the annual report was based on 
its discussions with management and the independent accountant.15 
Another central disclosure requirement is mandating disclosure in each 
proxy statement about whether the company has an audit committee. 
Finally, every three years the proxy statement must set forth the duties and 
responsibilities of the audit committee as stated in its charter.16 
In the hearings that preceded the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
witnesses frequently testified that the auditing process may be 
compromised because auditors view their responsibility as serving the 
company’s management and not the full board of directors or, for that 
matter, the shareholders.17 This raises two important concerns. Auditors 
who understand that their future retention depends on the very managers 
whose financial statements they are to review will behave accordingly. 
They will not make firm challenges to the accounting decisions made by 
management knowing that by doing so they jeopardize their continuing 
 13. For an excellent review of the developments preceding the changes in listing requirements 
with respect to audit committees and a comparison of the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq listing 
modifications after the Blue Ribbon Committee’s report, see Joseph I. Goldstein & Jeffrey F. 
Robertson, Modifications to Audit Committee Requirements May Increase Director Liability, 32 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 1104 (2000). 
 14. See Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 42,266, 71 SEC Docket 787 
(Dec. 14, 1999). 
 15. See Item 306(a)(4) of Regulation S-K, SEC Integrated Disclosure System for Small Business 
Issuers, 17 C.F.R. § 228.306(a)(4) (2000). This disclosure is accompanied by the names of the audit 
committee members and has as one of its purposes to link more closely the audit committee members 
to the financial statements included in the annual report. 
 16. See Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(d)(3)(ii) & (iii) (2000). 
 
 17. See generally S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 31 (2002). 
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relationship with the client. Also, auditors who view their professional 
relationship to be with the company’s managers, and not its directors or 
stockholders, are more likely to view inquiries put to the auditors by the 
outside directors as intrusive or simply irrelevant to their engagement.  
Concerns related to the independence of the auditors from the 
company’s managers are central to Sarbanes-Oxley.18 A key provision of 
the Act anchors the accountant’s relationship in the audit committee and 
not in management.19 The Act further buttresses its separation of the 
auditor from the managers by tightening the definition of independence for 
audit committee members from that embraced just a few years earlier by 
the Blue Ribbon Committee. To do this, the Act mandates that audit 
committees maintain procedures to address complaints regarding the 
issuer’s accounting, internal controls, or other auditing related matters and 
empowers audit committees to engage, as necessary, independent advisors 
at the issuer’s expense.20 Pursuant to authority set forth in a companion 
provision, the SEC has adopted criteria for a member of an audit 
committee to be considered a “financial expert,” and reporting companies 
are now required to disclose whether their audit committee includes a 
financial expert, and if not, the reasons for not having such a person on the 
committee.21 The importance of financial expertise on the audit committee 
is supported by a comprehensive study of governance criteria linked to 
earnings restatements. The study found that mere independence of the 
board or the audit committee was unrelated to the likelihood of a company 
encountering an earnings restatement; however, the probability of an 
earnings restatement was significantly negatively correlated with the audit 
committee composed of those with an accounting or finance background.22 
 18. See generally Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law 
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002). 
 19. See Sarbanes-Oxley Section 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 2002) (amending Section 10A 
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f and mandating that the SEC direct that the exchanges and the 
NASD adopt rules that provide that the audit committee “shall be directly responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work” of the company’s auditor). A few months 
before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, both the NYSE and Nasdaq tightened several of their governance 
requirements in areas that were later dealt with by Sarbanes-Oxley. For example, the proposed listing 
changes for both bodies require that audit committees must have the authority to retain and terminate 
the auditor. This requirement is, as seen above, now reflected in Sarbanes-Oxley.  
 20. See id. (barring any compensation to the audit committee member except director fees, 
whereas previously, independence existed so long as the amount received did not exceed $60,000). 
The SEC does, however, have authority to grant exemptions as it deems appropriate. Id. 
 21. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2003) (listing criteria for consideration); Item 401(h) of 
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(2) (2003) (establishing a three-part test for a financial expert); 
Item 309 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(1) (2003) (requiring disclosure of whether the 
audit committee includes a “financial expert”). 
 22. See Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Standards 
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Importantly, the SEC’s new rules, as well as the listing requirements of 
the NYSE and Nasdaq, impose a dialogue between the audit committee 
and the outside accountants for the purpose of eliciting any warning signs 
in the reporting system or management’s disclosure policies and practices. 
The auditor is to report, among other factors, on material issues that have 
surfaced in its assessment of the firm’s internal controls as well as any 
discussions it has had with management regarding the firm’s internal 
controls. The auditor must also share with the audit committee written 
communications it has had with management regarding “critical” 
accounting decisions as well as identify “critical” areas of the financial 
reports where an accounting estimate or principle change would affect the 
quality of the presentation.23 The listing requirements also mandate a 
discussion between management and the audit committee covering a range 
of topics, including a review of the quarterly and annual reports, earnings 
press releases, and earnings guidance given to analysts.24 
II. RECIPE FOR THE DEATH OF A PROFESSION 
CPAs view themselves as members of a profession because auditors 
impose upon themselves social obligations that transcend the client-
accountant relationship. This vision is correct in the sense that, as Dean 
Roscoe Pound so aptly observed, an organized profession is not “the same 
sort of thing as a retail grocers’ association.”25 The central word in the 
acronym for the auditors’ profession, CPA, is “public.” This six-letter 
word carries with it great meaning for it reflects the auditors’ undertaking 
to carry out their independent attest function26 pursuant to professional 
standards, namely that the financial statements have been reviewed 
(May 2003) (unpublished paper, on file with author), available at http://bama.ua.edu/ 
~aagrawal/restate.pdf. The author’s data also shows that the negative correlation is strengthened 
further if the audit committee includes the company’s chief financial officer (CFO). They explain the 
puzzling result with respect to the CFO being a member of the audit committee as the CFO providing a 
convenient channel for the flow of pertinent information that enables the committee to be more 
effective. 
 23. See Rule 2-07 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-07 (2003). 
 24. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards 
Committee Recommendation 7 (2002), available at http://www.NYSE.com/regulation/p1026568597. 
 25. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 7 (1953). 
 26. Skeptics may question whether auditors actually see themselves as professionals or merely 
pretend to be professionals. Such doubt is fed by the astonishing discovery by the SEC of 8,000 
violations by PricewaterhouseCoopers accountants of the prohibition against owning stock in their 
audit clients; the investigation revealed that thirty-one of forty-three top partners owned stock in their 
audit clients. See JERRY W. MARKAM, III, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE 
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 257 (2002). 
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pursuant to a body of generally accepted auditing standards. In light of that 
review, the auditors can certify that they were prepared in accordance with 
GAAP and fairly present the financial performance and position of the 
firm.  
It should be noted that the principles-rules debate has no natural 
connection to the clearly fraudulent reporting practices engaged in by 
Enron, WorldCom, and the other recently scandalous companies.27 Much 
of what has captured our attention was straightforward defiance of GAAP; 
the accounting and financial scandals were not the product of technical 
compliance with the metrics for financial reporting that nonetheless 
presented a false picture of the firm’s position or performance. The choice 
between principles or rules is implicated in the financial and accounting 
scandals, however, because the scandals invite close scrutiny of the 
auditors as professionals and the role of accounting metrics in auditing and 
their connection to professionalism. The question, therefore, is not what 
went wrong with the metrics but why misapplications of the metrics were 
not caught by the outside auditors. There is a further connection between 
professionalism and the rules-principles debate. Absent unambiguously 
articulated and finite reporting metrics, the norm for a principles-based 
accounting world, financial reporting will involve more areas of judgment 
in which decision-making can possibly be influenced by the self-interest 
of the accountant. Professionalism, of course, requires that self-interest not 
be part of the judgment process. Simply put, the causes for the 
accountants’ blindness that caused them not to question blatant material 
misrepresentations in Enron28 are not likely to be any less present, and in 
fact are likely to enjoy an even greater frequency, when matters involve 
numerous discrete judgments called for by ambiguous or broad accounting 
principles rather than a straightforward misapplication of a rule, as was the 
case in Enron. If this connection is accepted, then there is much in both 
recent history and the present environment of public accounting that 
makes the choice of principles over rules a disturbing outcome.  
The prime suspect for the accounting profession’s recent sorrowful 
performance as a gatekeeper against financial fraud is the rising 
importance of nonaudit services in overall operations of the major 
 27. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller, Enron May have Improperly Moved Up To $5 Billion, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 6, 2003, at B7 (summarizing report prepared in connection with the Enron bankruptcy 
finding that improper use of accounting fabricated ninety-six percent of Enron’s net income for 2000 
and concealed over $10 billion in debt). 
 28. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 
(2002). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p301 Cox book pages.doc10/24/03   11:41 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
310 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:301 
 
 
 
 
 
accounting firms. In 1976, audit fees constituted seventy percent of 
accounting firm revenues; by 1998 audit fees had fallen to thirty-one 
percent of their revenues. These changes occurred because nonaudit 
revenues were increasing three times faster than were revenues from audit 
services.29 There are multiple reasons why the accounting firms placed 
such an emphasis on growing their nonaudit services revenues. An 
unwitting accomplice in this effort was the effort of many audit 
committees to gauge their success by reducing the auditor’s fees rather 
than, for example, enhancing the quality of the audit.30 The pressure on 
audit fees also gave rise to a need for accounting firms to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors by offering a wider range of services.31 
There was, of course, the quest to share the good life enjoyed by the well-
compensated investment bankers and others with whom the accountants 
frequently interacted.32 Much of the revenue growth for nonaudit services 
was based solely on client demand; clients, believing that their auditors 
knew the clients’ businesses better than anyone else, concluded that there 
would be economies of scale by retaining the auditors for a range of 
consulting services rather than selecting a provider that was unfamiliar 
 29. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA 
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 116 (2002); McNamee et al., supra note 3, at 157. Between 1990 and 
1999, audit fees generated by the Big Five accounting firms for SEC registrants declined from 
seventy-one percent to forty-eight percent of total revenues while fees for tax work increased from 
seventeen percent to twenty percent, and consulting grew from twelve percent to thirty-two percent. 
See Public Oversight Board, The Panel on Audit Effectiveness Report and Recommendations 112 
(Aug. 31, 2000), at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/. In absolute terms, the total 1999 revenues of the 
Big Five accounting firms derived from SEC registrants was $26.5 billion; of this amount, $9.5 billion 
was generated from auditing fees. Id. See also Public Accounting Report Special Supplement Annual 
Survey of National Accounting Firms (2001) (providing a breakdown of revenue sources for the Big 
Five accounting firms). One study found that nonaudit revenues paid by 1,224 companies to their 
auditors were 2.5 times higher than audit revenues. See Gretchen Morgenson, Watchdog? Lap Dog? 
Why Have to Guess?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 3, at 1 (discussing a 2001 study by Investor 
Responsibility Research Center). The IRRC repeated its study in 2002 with similar results. See Press 
Release, Investor Responsibility Research Center Finds Little Change in Potential Auditor Conflicts, 
available at http://irrc.org/press_releases (Oct. 9, 2002) (finding that seventy-two percent of total fees 
paid by 1,245 SEC registrants were for nonaudit services). See also Accounting and Investor 
Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Bevis Longstreth, member, O’Mailey 
Comm.) (reporting there is a 2.69: 1 ratio of nonaudit to audit fees).  
 30. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission 1975-77). 
 31. See Prepared Statement of Arthur R. Wyatt before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Committee, Feb. 27, 2002. 
 32. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Depreciated: Did You Hear the One About the Accountant? Its Not 
Very Funny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at A1. 
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with the clients’ businesses and support systems.33 A further concern was 
the intense competition among accounting firms to recruit talent to the 
quiet life of the auditor. Consider that the number of accounting majors 
declined twenty-five percent between 1995 and 2000, matching a near 
identical decline in the number of individuals sitting for the national CPA 
exam.34 To attract talented auditors, the accounting firms had to offer a 
broader professional profile than being solely an auditor.35 This strategy 
also complemented the reality that auditing work had become more 
complex and technical by the 1990s so that audit teams needed to include 
technical non-accounting experts who would have been underemployed 
absent consulting opportunities.36  
From the various realities that attracted auditors and their clients to the 
joint proposition that the auditors should carry out both consulting and 
auditing assignments, it was but a short step before these same realities 
spun a web that obscured the auditors from their primary professional 
undertakings. The popular media may rightly have characterized the role 
of auditing services with the national accounting firm’s repertoire as a 
“loss leader” whereby the provision of audit services enabled the 
accountants to get their foot in the door so that they could thereafter 
provide more lucrative consulting services.37 Certainly, there is the 
lingering question why auditing could not be more lucrative than it was. 
After all the industry was dominated by a few national players—first the 
Big Eight, then the Big Five, and now the Final Four—so that one would 
have expected the industry to perform more as a cartel that earned 
 33. See Public Oversight Board, Panel on Audit Effectiveness Report and Recommendations 110-
11 (Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org; McNamee et al., supra note 3, at 156. 
 34. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement by William E. Balhoff, Chairman, Executive Committee AICPA Public Company 
Practice Section) (the number of accounting majors declined from 60,000 in 1995 to 45,000 in 2000 
and observing that in the decade 1991-2000 the total number of those taking the CPA exam had 
declined thirty-three percent). 
 35. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement by James E. Copeland, CEO, Deloitte & Touche) (“The best and the brightest seek 
positions that will allow them to develop their expertise, to learn, to work on cutting-edge issues. . . .”). 
 36. See Public Oversight Board, Panel on Audit Effectiveness Report and Recommendations 112 
(Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org.  
 37. See Noam Scheiber, How Arthur Andersen Got Away With It: Peer Revue, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 2002, at 19. Consistent with the loss leader thesis is an Arthur Andersen internal 
memorandum imposing a cap on the firm’s audit fees charged Waste Management Company because 
the client was viewed as a “crown jewel” with respect to the level of nonaudit revenues provided by 
Waste Management. See Arthur Andersen LLP Agrees to Settlement, SEC News Release No. 2001-62 
(June 19, 2001), available at 2001 WL 684751 [hereinafter Arthur Anderson LLP]. 
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oligopolistic profits. And they offered a product—auditing—for which 
there is no substitute from a more competitive market and which their 
customers were required by law to purchase. The “loss leader” thesis 
suggests that the accounting firms instead pursued a strategy to use the 
marketing power they enjoyed in one segment—the provision of audit 
services—to enter a more competitive and extremely lucrative consulting 
segment.  
Certainly the behavior of the national accounting firms is consistent 
with the loss leader thesis. For example, Ernst & Young set targets for 
nonaudit services that audit engagement partners were to meet with respect 
to each client; missing a target resulted in a ten percent salary reduction.38 
These developments had an obvious impact on the culture of auditing 
firms because firm leadership roles were more likely to be bestowed on 
those who were successful marketers rather than the most diligent and 
talented auditors.39 For example, Arthur Andersen’s engagement partner 
for Waste Management Company, a company that would be the focus of 
among the largest reporting violations to occur in the 1990s, was Robert 
Allgyer, a marketing director in Arthur Andersen’s national office whose 
job it was to coordinate the firm’s cross-selling efforts.40 And, completing 
the snare into which the engagement auditor found herself, each auditor’s 
compensation was frequently linked directly to the overall revenues 
attributed to each audit client.41  
 38. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Depreciated: Did You Hear the One About the Accountant? Its Not 
Very Funny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at A1. See also Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad 
Account: Andersen’s Fall From Grace Is a Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at 
A1 (reporting that Arthur Andersen adopted a program in 1998 that called upon engagement partners 
to double revenues from their clients by cross selling nonaudit services). 
 39. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (prepared statement of Arthur R. Wyatt). Accordingly, technicians were eased out of 
management and became themselves consultants to the auditing staff who were increasingly being 
overseen not by the most talented auditors but those who could sell or possessed nonaudit technical 
skills. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(statement of Lee Seidler, Deputy Chairman of the 1978 AICPA Commission on Auditor’s 
Responsibilities). 
 40. See Arthur Andersen LLP, supra note 37.  
 41. See, e.g., Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement of Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission 1998-
2001) (magnitude of audit and consulting fees in combination measured the profitability of the audit 
client and services of the engagement partner); Janet Kidd Stewart, Incentives Feed Audit Woes, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 10, 2002, at C1 (end of the year evaluation of engagement partners focused on what “kind 
of business you brought in.”). There were even powerful incentives for engagement partners not to 
question former financial statements as the auditor’s pay would be reduced when such a restatement 
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Another more troubling explanation for the growth of nonaudit services 
was that management easily saw this as a way to keep the outside auditor 
on a short leash. Management, unhappy with the auditor’s “second 
guessing” management’s artful use of accounting principles, could, of 
course, threaten to terminate the relationship. Under the current regulatory 
regime, this threat can easily be stared down by the auditor; to replace the 
accountant requires a prompt public disclosure on SEC Form 8-K,42 raises 
eyebrows within the investment community, and likely invites inquiry 
from the SEC. On the other hand, reducing or eliminating the amount of 
nonaudit services provided by the auditor is not required to be disclosed 
on Form 8-K. Thus, the provision of significant levels of nonaudit services 
by the auditors provides management with greater leverage over the 
auditor in the event of disagreements between management and the 
auditors. Herein lies one of the major concerns underlying auditors 
providing nonaudit services to their audit clients. A further bond between 
the auditor and its client is that audit clients hire a significant number of 
their auditor’s partners and staff to become members of their senior 
management.43 Thus, the auditor frequently finds herself staring across the 
desk into the piercing eyes of a former colleague, or even boss. 
There is no solid empirical support that nonaudit services in fact 
systematically compromise the quality of the outside accountant’s audit.44 
occurred. Id. 
 42. See Item 4 of SEC Form 8-K of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 43. See generally Proposed Rule: Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence 
Requirements, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42,994, 72 SEC Docket 1901 (June 30, 2000) 
(detailing these practices). Note in this regard that Sarbanes-Oxley adds Section 10A(l), 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78j-1(l) (West 2003), to the Exchange Act and bars auditors from certifying the financial statements 
of a reporting company if certain senior financial officers of the company have, within one year, 
carried out an audit of the reporting company for the auditing firm.  
 
 44. It remains a matter of speculation whether the accountant’s oversight of its audit clients’ 
financial statements was diminished by the Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), that there was no aiding and abetting liability 
under the antifraud provision. Since accountants continue to be liable for misstatements and omissions 
in the financial statements they audit, see Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th 
Cir. 1996), cf. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 
(1999), it is difficult to conclude that Central Bank provides any more than perhaps a false sense of 
security to the auditor. Arguably, the most significant weakening of the legal environment for auditing 
occurred earlier when the Supreme Court held that scienter was required for there to be a violation of 
the antifraud provision. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). By eliminating the 
possibility of negligence as a basis for liability, one might conclude that Ernst & Ernst induces less 
caution on the part of the auditors. There are at least two weaknesses to this argument. First, there is no 
reasonable basis to conclude that negligence was ever the standard or even an acceptable standard 
before Ernst & Ernst. See James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and Evaluation of 
Its Impact Upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977). Second, 
scienter was and continues to be an acceptable standard of fault under the antifraud provision. See, 
e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977); Keirnan v. Homeland, 
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The one systematic effort toward examining this connection points in the 
other direction. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness studied 126 audit 
engagements and identified thirty-seven, or twenty-six percent, of 
companies studied in which nonaudit services were provided.45 The Panel 
concluded that in none of these cases did the provision of nonaudit 
services compromise the quality of the audit; the Panel even opined that in 
one-fourth of the audits that were accompanied by nonaudit services, the 
consulting work had a positive impact on the quality of the audit.46 The 
Panel report, however, did not probe the more subtle question of whether 
nonaudit fees or, even more generally, the total fees received from the 
client compromised the auditor’s judgment; the Panel’s focus was instead 
on whether the act of providing nonaudit services impeded the audit 
function.47 Such a connection between the independence of judgment and 
rewards that are garnered by reaching client-friendly results has a good 
deal of intuitive support. Moreover, there are abundant anecdotal reports 
of professional judgments being so compromised.48 This indeed is an area 
Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1980). Thus, the auditor who becomes aware of a possible 
misrepresentation committed by management, but turns a blind eye to further investigating would 
appear to have acted at least recklessly.  
 45. Public Oversight Board, Panel on Audit Effectiveness Report and Recommendations (Aug. 
31, 2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/.  
 46. Id. at 113. See also K. Raghunandan et al., Are Non-Audit Fees Associated with Restated 
Financial Statements? Initial Empirical Evidence (unpublished working paper on file with the author) 
(Apr. 11, 2003) (finding no significant correlation between non-audit fees paid to auditors and 
likelihood of financial restatement); Rick Antel et al., The Joint Determinants of Audit Fees, Non-
Audit Fees, and Abnormal Accruals, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-21 (June 14, 2002) (finding no 
higher frequency of abnormal accruals were correlated with higher audit or nonaudit fees, although 
other studies cited to in this paper have reached a contrary result); Richard M. Frankel, Marilyn F. 
Johnson & Karen K. Nelson, The Relation Between Auditors’ Fees for Non-Audit Services and 
Earnings Management, MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4330-02 (July 2002) (the greater the nonaudit 
services the more likely it is that analysts’ forecasts will be met or exceeded and that there will be 
larger discretionary accruals). 
 47. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement of Lee Seidler, Deputy Chairman of the 1978 AICPA Commission on Auditor’s 
Responsibilities). 
 48. For example, in the Enron/Andersen case, an Andersen email reveals that members of the 
engagement team were concerned about Enron’s financial statements, but that same email also 
cautioned that future work for Enron “could reach $100 million per year.” Jane Mayer, The 
Accountants’ War, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 22, 2002, at 64, 68. See also Flynn McRoberts & Delroy 
Alexander, 1-Stop Tactic Casts Cloud on Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2002, at 1 (A former Andersen 
client is reported to have observed, “‘[T]he more consulting business we did with them, the more 
companies they would refer to me and the easier their audit partners would be in approving the 
deals.’”); John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 64 (reporting that 
Andersen’s substantial consulting fees from Waste Management were reported by those involved as a 
reason why the auditor signed off on Waste Management’s financials even after expressing doubt as to 
their accuracy); Jonathan Weil & Michael Schroeder, Waste Management Suit By SEC Zings 
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where it would not be foolish to trust one’s intuition. Doing so, however, 
has significant implications for the choice between principles and rules: 
[T]he loss of a client is a negative in one’s career path. Since many 
decisions required of audit firm managers and partners are 
judgmental in nature, rather than clearly prescribed by extraneous 
forces, such judgments are, at the margin, sometimes influenced by 
perceptions of the attitudes of leaders of a given firm. If those 
perceptions by firm audit personnel are that the loss of a client is 
damaging to one’s career path, the judgments made may be more in 
the direction of keeping the client than to achieving the fair 
presentation of financial statements.49 
The message may well be, therefore, that before adopting an approach 
that invites more discretion and judgment, as do generally-worded 
standards directed toward “fair presentations” of the firm’s performance 
and financial position, there must be a healthy regard for the reward 
structure within which such decision-making occurs.  
It is also possible to conclude that it is myopic to focus so intently on 
the revenues associated with nonaudit services. Audit failures predate the 
accounting industry’s undertaking significant consulting activities.50 
Indeed, a good deal of the auditor’s independence is compromised by the 
sheer magnitude of the audit fees associated with a client, especially if 
they view these fees as a perpetuity.51 With there being few instances of 
firms changing their auditors, the auditors can easily come to view the 
yearly audit revenues from a client as a perpetuity. So seen, the value of a 
client relationship can easily be determined by capitalizing the yearly audit 
fee at a low discount rate—low to reflect the small likelihood that the 
relationship will be terminated. This calculus yields a very high dollar 
value the engagement partner can place on preserving the relationship with 
Andersen, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2002, at C1 (SEC complaint alleges that soon after Andersen signed 
off on Waste Management’s fraudulent 1993 financial statements, it was awarded a $3.7 million 
consulting contract by Waste Management).  
 49. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (prepared statement of Arthur R. Wyatt). 
 50. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 51. See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission 1989-93). 
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the audit client.52 It is that calculation that underlies the arguments 
advanced by those who favor the periodic rotation of auditors.  
Just as the accounting firms transformed themselves during the 1990s 
to become lucrative consulting firms that also provided audit services, they 
also became, in that same period, a powerful lobbying force in 
Washington. Consider that the industry spent $41 million on lobbying 
activities between 1997 and 2001,53 and that each of the Big Five 
accounting firms were among the top 20 contributors to George W. Bush’s 
2000 presidential campaign.54 Indeed, there may well be some irony in the 
statistic that of the 248 Senate and House members who sat on 
congressional committees involved in the numerous investigations 
prompted by the financial scandals of 2002, 212 of them had received 
contributions from one or more the Big Five accounting firms.55 A 
significant issue for the accounting industry that drove it to become an 
important campaign contributor was the rising cost of litigation. An 
estimated twelve to fifteen percent of the accounting firms’ audit revenues 
were consumed by their defense and settlements of securities fraud 
actions.56 It comes as no surprise that the accounting industry’s most 
visible lobbying success was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) of 1995,57 which introduced a variety of defendant-friendly 
procedural and substantive requirements for the conduct of securities fraud 
suits.58 Success with the PSLRA was followed by other successes on the 
part of a profession which appeared to have become ever the more 
 52. For example, the most recent audit fees Arthur Andersen received from Enron were $25 
million. If viewed as a perpetuity and capitalized at ten percent, the value of the Arthur Andersen-
Enron relationship to Arthur Andersen was $250 million. 
 53. See Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.opensecrets.org. Their political donations 
increased yearly over the decade and were generally bipartisan, although a slight edge was enjoyed by 
the Republicans candidates in each year. Id. 
 54. See Stephen Labaton, Now Who, Exactly, Got Us Into This?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 3, 
at 1. 
 55. See Mark Fineman, Donations Could Taint Probe on Capitol Hill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, 
at A1.  
 56. See Jim Kelly, Accountancy: U.S. Cavalry May Come to the Aid of Big Six, FIN. TIMES, July 
13, 1995, at 10. 
 57. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
 58. For a detailed account of the accounting industry’s lobbying efforts, see John von Brachel, 
CPAs on Capitol Hill: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Passage of Securities Litigation Reform, J. OF 
ACCT., June 1996, at 15. See also John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and 
Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996) 
(reviewing the legislative history leading up to the final enactment). An important supporting group in 
the lobbying efforts consisted of the high tech firms, but representatives of the large accounting firms 
were throughout a leading force. Id. (reporting that Silicon Valley proponents of reform were 
persuaded they would become the victims of a securities fraud class action if their stock declined 
substantially). 
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emboldened by its new friends on Capitol Hill. For example, the SEC’s 
proposals to seriously restrict nonaudit work performed for the 
accountant’s audit client were deflected by an intense lobbying effort.59 
And, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt observed it was the accounting 
industry’s aggressive lobbying of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), when that body was considering the expensing of stock 
options, that caused him to conclude that the accounting profession was no 
longer aligned with investors.60 
So what has changed? Sarbanes-Oxley bars accountants from providing 
certain nonaudit services to their clients and mandates preapproval by the 
audit committee for those nonaudit services not barred that are to be 
performed for the client.61 At the time of this Article’s publication, reports 
continue to confirm that auditors continue to earn from their audit clients 
significantly more from consulting that from the provision of audit 
services. For example, the Wall Street Journal’s tally for the 30 companies 
that make up the Dow Jones Industrial Average shows that 62 percent of 
the revenues received by the auditors from their clients were for nonaudit 
services.62 The reported amount is down slightly from the figure the year 
 59. See Mike McNamee et al., supra note 3, at 157 (reporting that forty-six congressmen wrote 
to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt within the four weeks of the proposal; of that number, forty-three had 
received political contributions from the accounting industry). The issue of accountant’s independence 
was one of the factors that led to the demise of the Public Oversight Board. The SEC had directed the 
POB to conduct an independent investigation of independence standards followed by the Big Five 
accounting firms. This charge was met by funding being withheld from the POB by the SEC Practice 
Session, an arm of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants that was created for the 
purpose of being the exclusive funding for the POB. After the POB agreed to undertake a more limited 
investigation, funding was restored, but its investigation was seriously hampered because the 
accounting firms did not cooperate fully. See PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, FINAL ANNUAL REPORT, 
2001, at 3, 13, 36-7, 46 & 48, at http://www.publicoversightboard.org/2001.pdf.  
 60. See Arthur Levitt, Take on the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don’t Want 
You to Know. What You Can Do to Fight Back, reprinted in BUS. WK., Sept. 30, 2002, at 74. To be 
sure, the accountants were merely one among a larger chorus of voices raised against the expensing of 
stock options. See generally Greg Hitt & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Perk Police: Stock Options Come 
Under Fire in Wake of Enron’s Collapse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at A1 (reporting on mass rallies 
in Silicon Valley to oppose proposed action by the FASB); Julie Kosterlitz & Neil Munro, Full 
Disclosure, NAT’L J., Feb. 23, 2002, at 524 (recounting how both the Democratic and Republican 
leadership mobilized to capture support for their parties by creating organizations to attract support 
and funds around the issue). 
 61. See Section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley amending Section 10A(g)(h) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)(h) (West 2003). There is a de minimus exemption in paragraph (h) for 
preapproval for nonaudit services that do not exceed five percent of the total fees paid to the auditor. 
Possible laxity in the pre-approval provision is suggested in the report accompanying this provision, 
which observes that the law “does not limit the number of non-audit services that the audit committee 
may pre-approve at one meeting or occasion.” S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 20 (2002). Such an approach 
could lead to undesirable rubber stamping of extensive financial arrangements with the auditors over 
which management and not the audit committee would have influence over the auditors. 
 62. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Earn More From Consulting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
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before of seventy-five percent; however, the decline can be the result, in 
part, of the overall decline in consulting due to the stagnant economy. 
Investor concerns have caused some companies to terminate consulting 
projects with their auditors.63 Moreover, there appears to be no mass 
movement toward the regular rotation of accounting firms. The 
relationship between auditor and client therefore continues to reflect a 
perpetuity. How members of the audit committee have changed their 
behavior in the post-Enron era, or in the shadow of the new requirements 
hastened in by Sarbanes-Oxley, remains to be seen. Each has at least 
supported a booming cottage industry for directors’ colleges; so if the 
lesson has been learned one, therefore, has cause to expect that boards, at 
least in the near term, will be even more active in the review of their 
company’s financial reports. We might take solace in the continuing 
increase in the number of earnings restatements. A leading forensic 
accounting firm found a record-setting number of restatements for 2002, 
with the number of restatements reaching 330, a twenty-two percent 
increase over those for the preceding year.64 The restatements may well 
portend both a greater diligence on the part of the auditors as well as a 
stiffening of their resolve. Each, of course, would be hopeful signs of an 
improved financial reporting culture. 
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE CLIMATE FOR THE PRINCIPLES VS. RULES DEBATE  
The present principles-rules debate is taking place within an existing 
tapestry. There is good cause to doubt whether it is legally possible for 
rules to obscure a result that would be contrary to a core principle, such as 
the recognition of revenue. A coherent set of rules would always be 
anchored in their overarching policy. To be sure, those wishing to pervert 
the principle can also be expected to be as willing to pervert the rule that is 
to reflect the best thinking about what the principle is to mean in a 
particular case. But a perversion nevertheless it would be. Neither will 
16, 2003, at C9. It should be noted that three of the Final Four accounting firms have split-off their 
consulting operations. Only Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has not, recently canceling its efforts to do so 
because of the inability to finance the spin-off of its consulting operations. See Robert Frank & 
Deborah Solomon, Deloitte Touche Cancels Plans To Split Off Its Consulting Arm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
31, 2003, at C10. The spinning off of a firm’s consultants does not mean that the auditing firm does no 
consulting. The spin-off involves a range of practice areas, but not all areas are spun off. The most 
obvious practice area that continues within the auditing firm is the provision of tax advice. 
 63. See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low, GM Will End Consulting Projects With Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2003, at C7.  
 64. See Huron Consulting Group Report, supra note 4. Surprisingly, the number of companies 
with over $1 billion in revenues nearly doubled over the number in 2001. Id.  
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shield the parties from legal responsibility for their perversion. 
The reason for this self-assured conclusion is the continuing vitality of 
United States v. Simon.65 In Simon, two partners and a senior associate in a 
national accounting firm were convicted for knowingly certifying the 
financial statements of Continental Vending Machine Corporation because 
they knew, but did not disclose in the financial statements, that a reported 
receivable due from Valley (representing a loan to Valley by Continental) 
was not adequately collateralized, that Valley had lent the money to their 
mutual controlling stockholder, that there was great doubt it would be 
repaid, and that the loan amount had grown by more than ten percent in 
the period between the close of the fiscal year and the date the financial 
statements were certified.66 Eight representatives from the accounting 
industry testified that neither generally accepted accounting principles nor 
generally accepted auditing standards compelled this information to be 
disclosed.67 District Judge Mansfield refused to instruct the jury that the 
accountants could be guilty of fraud only if their conduct violated accepted 
accounting practices and the defendants had engaged in a willful departure 
from accepted accounting practices. Instead, he instructed the jury “that 
the critical test was whether the financial statements as a whole fairly 
presented the financial position of Continental.”68 The Second Circuit 
upheld the instruction, emphasizing that the overall focus was, as occurred 
in the district court, on whether there was a “fair presentation.”69 This 
holding is softened somewhat by Judge Friendly’s opinion acknowledging 
that the case was not one in which the accountant relied upon an 
articulated rule or prohibition for the accountant’s treatment of the 
receivable.70 But, the point raised by Judge Friendly can be further 
qualified if the hypothesized rule were to reflect a broader principle, and 
the defendant’s aggressive use of the rule placed the principle on its head. 
 65. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). 
 66. Id. at 799-805. 
 67. Id. at 805. 
 68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Simon can be seen as symmetrical with 
other conclusions reached under the securities laws. Simon holds that compliance with generally 
accepted accounting or auditing practices does not shield the accountant from responsibility if the 
accountant knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that consequently the financial statements 
misrepresent the company’s financial performance or position. On the other hand, failure to comply 
with GAAP alone does not offer a “strong inference” of fraud for purposes of pleading in securities 
litigation. See, e.g., In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. Securities Litigation, 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 69. Id. at 909-10. 
 70. Id. at 806 (“We do not think the jury was . . . required to accept the accountants’ evaluation 
whether a given fact was material to overall fair presentation at least not when the accountants’ 
testimony was not based on specific rules or prohibitions to which they could point, but only on the 
need for the auditor to make an honest judgment . . . .”).  
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Simon continues to be a beacon that guides disclosure toward a single 
objective: the fair presentation of the reporting firm’s financial 
performance and position. That this objective trumps technical compliance 
with an applicable set of accounting metrics is underscored not only by the 
contemporary vitality of Simon,71 but also by initiatives first undertaken by 
the SEC and virtually duplicated in Sarbanes-Oxley that mandate 
executive officer certifications that must occur on a quarterly basis. The 
chief executive officer and the chief financial officer each quarter must 
certify that (1) the officer has reviewed the financial reports, (2) to the 
officer’s knowledge the report “does not contain any untrue statement of 
material fact,” and (3) to the officer’s knowledge “the report fairly 
presents in all material respects the financial position and results of 
operations of the issuer.”72 The effect of Simon and the executive 
certifications is to link all rules and their overarching principles into a 
requirement of fair presentation of the company’s assets, liabilities, 
revenues, and expenses.  
Moreover, the dialogue73 now required between the auditor and the 
members of the audit committee reinforces this norm. As seen earlier, the 
auditor is to review with the audit committee the critical accounting 
estimates and choices that affect the reporting of the firm’s financial 
performance and position. Not only are the CEO and CFO required to 
reflect on whether the financial reports fairly report the company’s 
performance and position, but the audit committee similarly is to consider 
whether choices that were so made with respect to accounting estimates or 
principles prevented the required fair presentation. Obviously, the 
independence of the audit committee’s assessment serves as a reminder to 
the certifying officers that their own assessment of these matters should be 
taken seriously. Any disagreement between the audit committee’s own 
assessment and the bald certifications by the officers poses a conflict of 
 71. See, e.g., Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994) (although dismissing a 
complaint against an auditor for its failure to disclose publicly its concerns regarding weaknesses in 
the firm’s internal controls, the court recognized that fair presentation was not affected by non-
disclosure, but would not permit a blind obeisance to GAAP or GAAS to preclude liability); Seiffer v. 
Topsy’s Int’l, 487 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1980) (accountant who knows he is substantially assisting in 
fraud is liable even though in compliance with GAAP); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & 
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(accountants could not hide behind GAAP when they had serious doubts that a purchaser would be 
able to pay for an item purchased on credit); Maduff Mortgage Corp. v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 779 
P.2d 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting instruction that accountant would be liable only if it failed to 
adhere to GAAP). 
 72. See Securities Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 & 15d-14, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14 & 240.14d-14 
(2002) (implementing Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 
 73. See discussion in text at note 23. 
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the type that likely will trigger the authority under Sarbanes-Oxley for the 
audit committee to retain its own independent advisors to review the 
matter. The possibility that the audit committee will resort to an 
independent evaluation of the fairness of the reporting presentation should 
cause executive officers to take their certifications seriously. This result is 
likely because officers should understand that conflicting views between 
the audit committee and the senior officers regarding “fair presentation” 
weaken the directors’ confidence in the executives and could, therefore, 
lead ultimately to a change in management. This dynamic also has 
implications for the audit committee members. Their own assessment is an 
important cog in the wheel that Congress and the SEC have established to 
assure accurate and fair financial reporting. To this end, not only is a 
dialogue mandated, but the auditor’s relationship, as seen earlier, is 
anchored in the audit committee, and the committee is rendered even more 
independent by its statutory authority to retain independent advisors in 
carrying out its mission. Overall, the strengthened requirements of the 
audit committee and the executive certifications interact to drive reporting 
toward principles, or at least a single principle, of fair presentation, and 
away from a more technical orientation toward rules.  
IV. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE AND THE EFFECTIVE PUBLIC COMPANY 
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD 
Sarbanes-Oxley is historic not solely because of the volume of its 
amendments to the securities laws. The Act’s significance also arises 
because of the incursions it makes on matters that historically have been 
the exclusive province of the states—corporate governance. As seen 
above, the Act assigns specific tasks to the audit committee and confers 
broad rule-making authority on the SEC to amplify the committee’s 
charge. The resulting directives interact with the more generalized state 
law obligations of directors, at least until perhaps a second federal shoe 
drops, so that the audit committee’s discharge of its federal tasks will 
continue to be examined through the state law fiduciary duty lens. 
Consistent with the monitoring role of outside directors, state law 
permits directors to rely upon the advice, reports, and opinions of their 
advisors. Their reliance is not permitted, however, when the directors have 
knowledge that makes their reliance unwarranted.74 The widespread 
 74. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §§ 8.30(d), (e)(1), (e)(2) (2002). Section 
8.30(d) reads in relevant part as follows: “In discharging board or committee duties a director, who 
does not have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on information, opinions, 
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concern that the independence of the auditors is compromised when the 
auditors provide extensive consulting services to their audit clients has yet 
to manifest itself in the case law. There is no direct precedent-rendering 
reliance upon an advisor unwarranted if the advisor enjoys an on-going 
consulting relationship with the company75 or, more generally, if the 
advisor anticipates a past financially beneficial relationship to continue.76 
Indeed, by Sarbanes-Oxley and the proposed listing requirements of the 
NYSE and Nasdaq so clearly shifting the source of the auditor’s 
relationship from management to the audit committee, the conclusion can 
well be that the newly invigorated audit committee provides even greater 
justification today than in the past for the directors to rely upon the reports 
made to it by the outside auditors. This link is further underscored by the 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley that not only bar a firm’s auditor from 
providing several types of nonaudit services to its audit client, but also call 
for nonaudit services allowed under the Act to be pre-approved by the 
audit committee.77 In this way, Sarbanes-Oxley directly confronts the 
problem described earlier, namely that auditing firms had evolved into 
multi-faceted practices where the revenues garnered in nonaudit areas 
posed a serious threat to the auditor’s independence. Nevertheless, our 
disquiet should remain to the extent auditors provide nonaudit services to 
their audit clients, and it is management and not the audit committee that 
effectively controls that portion of the client-auditor relationship. 
It should be observed, however, that Sarbanes-Oxley proscribes only 
the most serious types of nonaudit services, not all nonaudit consulting. 
reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by 
. . . one or more officers . . . [or] public accountants. . . .” 
 75. It would appear reasonable to conclude that directors could not rely on those portions of 
financial statements for which the auditor was certifying the accuracy of its own inputs into the 
financial reporting process. This could occur, for example, if the tax treatment was material to the 
presentation of an item and the auditor had been deeply involved in structuring the transaction so that 
its audit-consulting client could obtain the maximum benefits under the tax law with respect to a novel 
tax strategy. 
 76. The notable exception here involves special litigation committees. An important 
consideration in determining the independence of a committee charged with responsibility in assessing 
the corporate interest with respect to a derivative suit is whether the committee has retained counsel 
with no historical relationship with the company and, more to the point, the officers who are the focus 
of the derivative suit. See, e.g., Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78 (Wis. 2000) (emphasizing 
committee’s independence is linked to that of its counsel). On the linkage between the outside 
directors’ review of conflict of interest transactions involving officers and securing truly outside 
counsel, see James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside 
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077 (2003). 
 77. See Securities Exchange Act Section 10A(g & h), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g & h) (West 2003) 
(added by Section 202 of Sarbanes-Oxley). See also Rule 2-01(c)(4) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 210.2-01(c)(4) (2003) (refines the list of prohibited services). 
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For example, the provision of tax advice continues to be a valuable part of 
the auditing firms’ consulting practices to their clients.78 Thus, the lure of 
nonaudit revenues still exists in important areas and can still pose, in 
certain instances, a serious threat to the independence of judgment by the 
auditor. Also, the Public Company Accounting Standards Board created 
by the Act has the power to constrict or qualify the eight types of nonaudit 
services that currently are proscribed by the Act79 so that the prohibitions 
may not be nearly as sweeping in the future as they appear to be today. 
The audit committee must therefore always be attentive to the scale of the 
auditor’s dependence on management judgments for continual consulting 
and other nonaudit revenues to assure that its reliance upon the auditors 
remains warranted.  
This fear continues today, even after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The fount of the fear is not just that there continues to be a lot of nonaudit 
services that the auditors perform for their clients or that they correctly 
view their relationship to the firm as a perpetuity. The enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, stepped up disclosure requirements by the SEC, and the 
enhanced listing requirements of the NYSE and Nasdaq have brought a 
seismic shift in the legal environment for financial reporting. Nevertheless, 
there is good cause for concern that the culture of accounting has not yet 
moved forward to reflect these changes. As seen earlier, auditors continue 
to have significant consulting relationships with their audit clients. 
Customs change slowly so that auditors and directors may too easily 
continue business as it was, without an ever-present awareness that 
management is no longer the auditor’s employer. And, with respect to the 
nonaudit services the auditor performs, despite the preapproval 
requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley, realistically it is the management and not 
the audit committee that decides to award the consulting engagement to 
the auditors. 
The degree of the audit committee’s attentiveness to possible 
compromises in the auditor’s judgment is unaffected by whether 
accounting metrics are principles-based or rules-based. Recall that Simon 
can be read somewhat narrowly because the reporting practice employed 
by the auditors there did not rest on a formal rule or exception to a 
principle. One of the forces that has driven accounting to become more 
 78. Id. See also Order Regarding Section 103(A)(3)(B) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities 
Act Release No. 8222, 80 SEC Docket 142 (Apr. 25, 2003) (adopting on interim basis the status quo 
for auditor independence until further action by the PCAOB). 
 79. See Securities Exchange Act Section 10A(g)(9), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)(9) (West 2003) 
(added by Section 202 of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
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rules-based and less principles-based has been the desire by auditors to 
shield themselves from liability by being able to base their professional 
actions on precise rules.80 In this way, Simon’s qualifications may 
themselves contribute to the present rules-oriented approach of GAAP. 
Even though this may be so, it would be a fundamental subversion of 
Simon to permit a rule to cloud the vision of a principle. Simon’s overall 
tenor is the need for information to be fairly presented, not merely in 
accordance with rules that operate independent of concerns about whether 
in combination they fairly present the firm’s financial performance and 
position. Therefore, in a rules-based environment, the mandated audit 
committee dialogue must probe whether the auditors have found safe 
haven among the rules at the expense of an overall accurate report of the 
firm. On the other hand, a principles-based environment leaves a host of 
reporting issues to judgment that also pose the same threat of compromise 
if the auditors do not abide by their client being the audit committee and 
instead become captives of their own economic self-interest.81 Stated 
somewhat differently, the life of the audit committee and its overall 
effectiveness may well be no different in either a rules-based or principles-
based reporting environment. In either case, the audit committee must be 
attentive to whether there is a fair presentation. For this reason, the SEC’s 
recent study engaging the choice between rules and principles steers a 
course that lists toward principles by calling for “objectives-oriented” 
standard setting whereby accounting principles are adopted that contain a 
good deal of specificity in stating their objective.82 To be sure, audit 
committees, much like their auditors, may be more easily seduced by the 
sirens of rules than by principles because of the false comfort one finds in 
finite requirements. It is just much easier to engage a debate on more 
general principles than to bear the burden of establishing that a rule in a 
 80. See FASB Proposal, supra note 5. 
 81. See, e.g., Remarks of Robert Herz, Chair, FASB, May 16, 2002, reported in 34 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. No. 20 at 813 (principles-based accounting “requires auditors to be true professionals and, as I 
say, stand tall”); FASB Proposal, supra note 5, at 5 (“The [FASB] Board emphasizes that, if adopted, a 
principles-based approach to standard setting would require changes in the processes and behaviors of 
all participants in the U.S. financial accounting and reporting process, not just the FASB and other 
standard-setting bodies.”). Under a principles-based approach, “preparers and auditors would need to 
apply professional judgments in more circumstances, while the SEC, investors, creditors, and other 
users of financial information must accept the consequences of applying professional judgment, 
including some divergence in practice.” Id. at 9. For a discussion of why it is that bias is more likely to 
be reflected under a principles-based than rules-based standards, see Max H. Bazerman, George 
Loewenstein & Dan A. Moore, Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 97, 101 
(2002) (citing research supporting conclusion that it requires very little ambiguity in a guiding 
standard to invite biased judgments). 
 82. See SEC Study of Principles-Based Accounting, supra note 5. 
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precise case perverts an underlying principle.  
Against these considerations, the complete independence of the 
auditors is not only desirable, it is absolutely essential. It is difficult to 
believe that the audit committee, as it exists in the post Sarbanes-Oxley 
era, can assure a fair presentation in either a rules-based or principles-
based environment if the auditor’s agenda includes any dependence on the 
goodwill of management. To be sure, it remains too early to tell whether 
the accountants now view, as the law requires, their client to be the audit 
committee and not the senior management team. When there are 
demonstrative reports of multiple instances of an audit committee 
retaining a different accounting firm than the one that has historically 
served the company, there will then be a stronger basis than there exists 
today for concluding that the auditor’s dependence on management has 
been severed. Similarly, there would be a greater basis to believe the 
system is working as planned if there were more evidence that audit 
committees provide the initiative for changing the financial reports from 
those proffered by management and concurred in by the auditors. Events 
such as these may well occur. But if the auditors are not as independent as 
embraced in the model of governance now embraced by Sarbanes-Oxley, 
the victims will include the members of the audit committee and the 
investors who rely upon their oversight of the financial reporting process. 
Recall the dialogue that Sarbanes-Oxley requires between the auditor 
and the members of the audit committee. But more importantly, consider 
the vision of the audit committee members that underlies this dialogue. 
The safeguards introduced by Sarbanes-Oxley’s treatment of the audit 
committee depend on the vitality of the interchange between the auditors 
and the committee members. This begins with the call for complete 
independence on the part of the committee members. The requirement of 
independence is to avoid scripted rituals between auditors and committees. 
That is, the call for a totally independent committee is a requirement that 
the committee reflect its independence not solely by evaluating the 
financial statements, but through a close analysis of the mandated dialogue 
that includes reviewing the written communications between the auditors 
and management on critical accounting matters as well as the critical 
accounting estimates and principles in preparing the financial statements. 
The financially literate requirements of the NYSE and Nasdaq recognize 
that the committee must be able to seek appropriate information from the 
auditors and to understand the auditor’s reply. The committee is not to 
carry out the audit, but instead is to probe whether the numbers fairly 
present the position of the firm. The committee objectively is to satisfy 
itself that the financial reports are what they purport to be. To this end, the 
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committee is totally dependent upon the auditor’s response to the 
committee’s questions. The committee’s financial literacy invites follow 
up questions and probing when the circumstances so warrant. It is at this 
juncture where the utopian view of the committee may not mesh well in 
practice. Committee members, for a host of reasons, may not be as diligent 
as they should, or they may overlook the nuance of the accountant’s reply 
to a question. As a consequence, the questions that are contemplated by 
the mandated dialogue can serve no greater good than the answers they 
ultimately elicit. In the end, the audit committee is charged with a very 
substantial burden that requires its substantial reliance on the auditors. The 
question then becomes, how comfortable are we that the committee will 
get the right response or a response that is unvarnished from a 
management perspective.  
Failure on the auditor’s part to provide complete, accurate, and truthful 
responses to the committee’s questions invites, in appropriate 
circumstances, doubts whether the committee’s reliance was warranted. 
This failure will not likely be of a scale to expose the directors to liability 
under state law or federal law.83 The personal liability of audit committee 
members is not the desired goal of Sarbanes-Oxley. The objective instead 
is improved financial reporting. As described above, the weakness within 
the mandated dialogue occurs not because the audit committee members 
will not ask the right questions, but because their advisor, the auditor, 
either provides incomplete or misleading answers or simply does carry out 
the type of review that will provide a trustworthy response. The audit 
committee’s independence and the anchoring of the auditor’s relationship 
in the committee are each mechanisms to assure greater independence on 
the part of the auditor. However, as seen above, the auditor’s 
 83. The directors’ conduct likely would be deemed not to be willful and, hence, protected from 
damages based on any state law claim by an existing immunity shield. See Arnold v. Society Savings 
Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 1996) (directors immune to suit for negligence in performing 
their disclosure obligations because of provision in company’s charter). The directors’ conduct also 
would likely be beyond the reach of the securities laws’ antifraud provisions. See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Doubts even exist with respect to whether this would rise to the level 
of recklessness so that liability could arise under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws where 
the necessity of pleading a strong inference on the part of the directors poses a significant hurdle in the 
path of those seeking to impose liability. Cf. Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(pleadings against accounting firm fell short of establishing strong inference of scienter); Danis v. 
USN Communications, Inc., 121 F. Supp.2d 1183 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (mere negligent audit does not give 
rise to liability under Rule 10b-5); Nappier v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 227 F. Supp.2d 263 
(D.N.J. 2002) (though there was some indication of accounting irregularities the allegations fell short 
of creating a strong inference of scienter under Rule 10b-5); SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 
1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recklessness “requires more than a misapplication of accounting 
principles.”).  
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independence requires a complete severance from management; otherwise, 
the dialogue will not occur or will not have the fullness it would have had. 
It is at this juncture of the problem that the PCAOB can make a significant 
contribution to making audit committees effective guardians of 
stockholders’ interests and also assure that principles can reign supreme 
over rules. 
Sarbanes-Oxley created the PCAOB as an independent self-regulatory 
organization to, among its other powers, “establish or adopt, by rule, 
auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards 
relating to the preparation of audit reports” for companies subject to the 
SEC reporting requirements.84 The body of existing auditing standards and 
procedures is as vast as the lore that comprises GAAP. It is clearly a 
challenge for the new SRO to decide where to begin, what existing rules to 
adopt, and where to propose changes. It is the position of this Article that a 
core consideration throughout the PCAOB’s actions should be fostering an 
environment for auditors to perform their vocation as professionals. If this 
occurs, then the dialogue now mandated for the audit committee will be a 
meaningful one: the principle of fair presentation of a firm’s financial 
performance and position will prevail regardless of any countervailing 
rules that may project a more favorable report of management’s 
stewardship.
 
 
 84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, Section 101(c)(2) (2002); 
15 U.S.C.A.§ 7211 (West 2003). 
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